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1. Aim of the paper 
This paper is about the modal interpretation of Indefinite Generic Sentences 
(ISs), illustrated in (1). 
(1) A lion has a mane 
On the assumption that ISs involve a silent generic quantifier GEN, 
which is taken to be a modal operator, it has been argued (Krifka et al. 1995) 
that GEN can have different interpretations, corresponding to those of overt 
modalities in ISs sentences. In this view, (2-a) would be interpreted as in (2-
b), and the silent operator GEN in (2-a) would have the deontic flavor of the 
overt modal must in (2-b). One of the aims of this paper is to show that GEN 
is not the silent counterpart of overt modality. 
(2) a. A lady is well behaved 
 b. A lady must be well behaved 
The second aim of the paper consists of providing a new modal analysis 
for ISs in which we reconsider the relations between facts and their 
categorization. To account for this relation, we use two parameters: worlds 
and „respects‟. 
The framework that we propose allows us to account for the fact that, 
contrary to what theoreticians have claimed, ISs are not analytic statements. 
To state it briefly, the core argument in defense of the traditional view is 
the following. There are two distinct ways to obtain the generic reading of a 
sentence. The first is by directly making reference to a kind, as in (3), where 
the definite singular denotes the kind „lion‟. 
(3) The lion has a mane 
The second way is to use characterizing sentences, where the generic 
reading cannot be identified with a particular constituent, but rather belongs 
to the whole sentence. Characterizing sentences have been argued to be of 
two sorts. In English, one distinguishes between indefinite singular generics 
(IS-sentences or ISs (4-a)) and bare plural sentences (BP-sentences or BPs 
(4-b)). In Romance languages, one can use ISs (5-a) or definite plural 




(4)  a. A madrigal is polyphonic  
 b. Madrigals are polyphonic 
(5)  a. Un madrigale è polifonico 
  A madrigal is polyphonic  
 b. I madrigali sono polifonici 
 ‘The’ madrigals are polyphonic 
The current generalization about ISs is that they express only definitional 
properties, as illustrated in (4-a) and (5-a). 
This explains why (6-a) and (7-a) are not acceptable: popular is not a 
definitional property of madrigals. BPs and DGs are acceptable with both 
definitional and non-definitional properties ((4-b)-(5-b) and (6-b)-(7-b)) (e.g., 
Lawler 1973, Dahl 1975, Burton- Roberts 1977). 
(6)  a. *A madrigal is popular  
 b. Madrigals are popular 
(7) a. *Un madrigale è popolare 
 A madrigal is popular 
 b. I madrigali sono popolari 
 ‘The’ madrigals are popular 
We reconsider this generalization, argue that ISs are synthetic a priori 
statements and provide an analysis for this view. 
Finally, the paper proposes a systematization of the recent, fruitful 
debate on ISs. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide new data to 
show that GEN is not the silent counterpart of overt modalities in ISs. In 
Section 3, I discuss previous accounts and provide some new observations. 
We present our analysis in Section 4 and derive the predictions from it in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
                                                          
1 see Mari, Beyssade, Del Prete (in press) for a more extended discussion of Romance 
languages, taking into account both French and Italian. For French, specifically, 
see Carlier, 1989; Vogeleer and Tasmowski, 2005; Mari, 2008a,b). 
2 GEN and overt modalities 
2.1 Extensional and intensional interpretation of GEN 
There are two contrasting views for the analysis of ISs, both of which use the 
silent quantifier GEN. 
In the extensional approach, GEN means always and quantifies over 
situations (e.g., de Swart, 1991).
2
 This view has been criticized based on a 
number of grounds, notably by Ferreira (2005). In addition to the 
shortcomings discussed by Ferreira, another difficulty that this approach 
faces consists of missing the explanation for the incompatibility of ISs with 
non-definitional properties, like popular. Assuming that ISs involve a silent 
quantifier always amounts to assuming that (6-a) would have to be 
interpreted as in (8). However, (8) is an acceptable sentence, in contrast to (6-
a). 
(8) A madrigal is always popular 
In the modal approach, GEN is considered to be an intensional 
quantifier that quantifies over worlds. Our proposal is related to this second 
type of approach.
3
 Semanticists who assume a modal approach agree with the  
key components of the analysis given in (9) and (10). In (9), GEN is an 
adverb of quantification (à la Lewis 1975) that binds any variable in its 
scope, and the indefinite provides a free variable (Heim, 1982) that gets 
bound by GEN (9). Translated into possible world semantics, (9) is further 
unpacked in (10) (see Eckart 2000 for details). 
(9) GEN x [P(x)] [Q(x)] 
(10) ∀w′ ∈ MB(w),x[P(x,w′) → Q(x,w′)] 
(10) says that in all worlds of the modal base under consideration, if 
something is a madrigal, it is also polyphonic. (10) has the form of a 
conditional and is meant to express the non-accidental nature of the relation 
between p and q: if an entity is a p entity, it is also a q entity. 





                                                          
2 See criticism by Ferreira, 2005. 
3 For discussion about GEN meaning always, see Ferreira, 2004 and Mari, Beyssade 
and Del Prete, in press. 
2.2 Empirical questions: the relation between silent and overt modality 
in ISs 
The question that immediately arises concerns the relation between GEN (as 
a modal quantifier) and overt modalities. Krifka et al. (1995) explain that the 
choice of the modal base is determined by the corresponding sentence with 
an overt modality and that there is, for example, a correspondence between 
(11-a)-(12-a) and (11-b)-(12-b). 
(11)  a. A gentleman opens the door for ladies  
 b. A turtle lives for a long time span 
(12)  a. A gentleman must open the door for ladies   
 b. A turtle can live a long time span 
This analysis has various shortcomings, some of which were already noted in 
Krifka et al. (ibid.). 
1. First, ISs with covert modality are not always synonymous with ISs 
with overt modality, as the oddness of (13-b) shows. In contrast, (13-a) is 
perfectly fine. 
(13) a. A boat floats  
 b. ??A boat can float 
2. A second shortcoming pertains to (14). Krifka et al. (ibid., 56) writes: 
"... This sentence evokes a kind of "realistic" modality in which the laws of 
biology hold. However, the worlds in which no turtle ever dies a premature 
death are biologically highly abnormal...". 
(14) A turtle lives a long time span 
3. Another potential problem for assuming that GEN corresponds to a 
covert modality of any type is that one cannot rule out ‟accidental‟4 
properties (15). It is not trivial to rule out the possibility that in most similar 
worlds, it is true that rap songs are popular. 
(15) *A rap song is popular 
4. Although, as has often been observed, ISs are preferred when 
‟definitional‟ properties are used, they are unproblematic with non-
definitional properties when modality is overtly present. The examples are 
from Krifka (in press). 
                                                          
4 We use quotes because the term is, for the time being, undefined, and one of the 
aims of this paper is to explain what the notion of accidentality amounts to in 
relation with the interpretation of ISs, cf. infra.  
 (16) a. A trout can be caught by many different methods 
 b. A poodle should be clipped by a professional groomer 
 
In languages such as French, overt modality can rescue sentences that 




(17)  a. ??Un indien monte à cheval 
  An Indian rides horses 
 b. Un indien sait monter à cheval 
  An Indian is able to ride horses 
If covert modality corresponding to overt modality were in fact present, 
the sentence should not be odd. 
The following question then arises: if IS-statements cannot be reduced 
to the corresponding statements with overt modality, then what kind of modal 
reasoning do they involve? 
Recent debate on ISs has provided various answers to this question. The 
starting assumption in (10) reveals that there is a sort of causal reasoning 
involved in IS sentences, and this reasoning takes the form of a conditional. 
Theories divide on their views about the type of causal reasoning involved, 
and they enrich the analysis in (10) in different ways. 
2.3 One more piece of data 
Before discussing previous accounts, we introduce a final piece of data, 
which, prima facie, seems to cast doubt on the current generalization, 
according to which ISs are compatible only with definitional properties.  
It has been repeatedly observed that this is not a correct generalization 
and that the choice of definitional properties is a preference rather than a 
requirement associated with ISs. ISs that do not involve definitional 
properties are illustrated in (18) (see Putnam 1975; Cohen 2001; Corblin in 
press; Krifka in press)
6
. 
(18) a. A refrigerator costs 1000 dollars 
 b. A football player earns a lot of money 
 c. A researcher earns little money 
                                                          
5 Prosody is another way to rescue some sentences, see Mari, 2008a, b.  
6 These are all cases in which there is no overt modality or temporal adverb because 
overt modalities and temporal adverbs always allow ‟accidental‟ properties, as 
in A rap is always popular; A rap can be popular. 
The example below also illustrates this point. Suppose that City Hall in 
New York has decided that restaurants must close one day a week. In 
particular, it has been decided that Italian restaurants close on Tuesdays. The 
following is an acceptable ISs sentence. 
(19) An Italian restaurant is closed on Tuesday 
With these cases in mind, we now turn to previous accounts. As we 
cannot do justice to the huge literature on this topic, we will not discuss 
proposals that have not raised the question of what the relation between GEN 
and overt modalities is. To introduce our own account, we focus instead on 
theories that have addressed this question and, more generally, that have 
discussed the status of modal representations in relation to genericity. 
3 Theories and data: discussion 
There are various ways in which (10) has been amended and enriched. Here, 
we identify three types of modal approaches: (1) dispositional accounts, (2) 
normal and ideal worlds accounts, and (2) rules and regulation approaches.  
3.1 ISs as dispositional statements 
Following Dahl (1975), Menendez-Benito (2005,in press) argues that 
generics like (20) are dispositional statements and proposes the following two 
diagnostics to identify them. The first is the „can‟ paraphrase in (21-a). The 
second is incompatibility with free choice items (21-b). Generic statements 
are argued to involve a covert can (rather than a covert must as assumed in 




(20) This printer prints any document 
(21) a. This printer can print any document  
 b.  *This printer must print any document 
Menendez-Benito(ibid.) claims that the specificity of the covert can 
consists of being restricted to „inner dispositions‟. Moreover, the covert can 
does not require that the property denoted by the embedded infinitive be 
instantiated in the actual world. In (22), if John is a human, then there is the 
inference that he has already played the trombone at some point in the past; if 
John is a robot, then the inference is that he has not necessarily played the 
                                                          
7 Note that Menendez-Benito (in press) does not focus on ISs sentences. However, 
Menendez-Benito (ibid.) seems to make a general claim, which seems to target 
all types of characterizing sentences. 
trombone before. The covert can is claimed to be present in the latter case 
only because humans do not have „inner dispositions‟ for playing the 
trombone. 
(22) John plays the trombone 
The main advantage of the theory is that (23-a) and (23-b) are not 
predicted to be synonymous because overt can is not required to be restricted 
to „inner dispositions‟. The unacceptability of (23-b) is not explained, but the 
sentence is also not predicted to be felicitous. 
(23) a. A boat floats 
 b. ??A boat can float 
This account faces some shortcomings. The first pertains to one of the 
diagnostic tests. It has been shown (see Giannakidou, 2011) that the universal 
modal must is compatible with free choice items, see (24). Corpus examples 
corroborate the description.  
(24) Scenario: mistake task-force: You must find any mistakes and report them right 
away 
 (25)  a. To activate this quest you must find any one of them. To complete it, you 
must find them all and place them on the Altar of Dumat, on the Tower's 
(www.bonefishgamer.com accessed March 11, 2012) 
  b. In order to get your script uploaded , you must find any directory 
with 777 permissions on it  
  (hossamozein.blogspot.com/.../how-to-create-your…) 
 
The second is that it does not capture the proper cases. Imagine a 
scenario in which my three- weeks- old son is about to smile, but has not 
smiled yet. Definitely, he certainly has the „inner disposition‟ to smile (unless 
it turns out that there is some abnormality, which would prevent this). Still, 
uttering my son smiles implies that he has already smiled.  
More generally, when extended to IS sentences (though it is not 
primarily designed for this), the account can capture only a subset of the 
various types of ISs. In particular, it seems to fall short with cases such as 
those in (18). In (18-c), for instance, there is no ‟inner disposition‟ for a 
researcher to earn little money. Note that this is also true of a particular 
researcher in this researcher earns little money (e.g., a French researcher).
8
 
                                                          
8 This shortcoming is also seen in Greenberg‟s (2002) account of ISs as involving an 
‟in virtue of‟ property. For Greenberg, the sentence A boy does not cry 
expresses a causal relation between the property ‟being a boy‟ and the property 
‟not crying‟, which involves a third property, namely ‟being tough‟. Again, for 
A counter-argument to this objection might be that (18-c) is not relevant 
because the paraphrase „A researcher can earn little money‟ does not lead to 
the intended interpretation of the sentence. Nonetheless, even in cases that 
pass the can-diagnostic, as in (26), there is not necessarily an „inner 
disposition‟ at stake. (26) is perfectly compatible with the interpretation 
according to which a Chinese person can learn any sign because he is obliged 
to work hard, not because s/he has an inner disposition to do so. 
 (26) a. A Chinese person learns any sign  
 b. A Chinese person can learn any sign 
3.2 Normal and ideal worlds; normal and ideal objects 
In an influential paper, Pelletier and Asher (1997) argue that generic 
sentences are about ‟normal‟ objects. These „normal objects‟ are to be found 
in „normal worlds‟
9
. The „normal world approach‟ elaborates on the ordering 
source in (10) and restricts generic sentences to circumstantial modal bases. 
The correspondence between different flavors of GEN and ISs with an overt 
modality of different types does not arise. Generic sentences are claimed to 
be about special types of objects and worlds: normal ones. 
The main advantage of this theory is that it allows one to explain the 
existence of exceptions by appealing to „abnormality conditions‟. It is often 
noted that generic statements tolerate exceptions very easily. In principle, 
turtles live a long time, but in fact, most of them die young because of 
predators. As for the old turtle case, the normal world approach explains that 
turtles die old only in worlds that are more normal than ours.  
This „normality theory‟ has been commented upon in a large number of 
works. The obvious question is the following: what is „normal‟ for a turtle? 
What is „normal‟ for an Italian restaurant? (Is what is normal not to be closed 
on Tuesdays?) We refer the reader to Eckardt 2000 and Cohen 2002 for 
extensive criticism. 
A variant of this view is the ‟ideal‟ object view (Eckart, 2000). 
According to this approach, the turtle who dies old is an „ideal‟ turtle. 
However, here again, what is ideal for a turtle? Is an Italian restaurant that 
does not open on Tuesdays an ideal Italian restaurant? 
                                                                                                                             
(18-c), there seems to be no ‟in virtue of ‟property that explains why a 
researcher should earn little money. We will not discuss Greeneberg‟s account 
any further here because it has already been discussed in a number of works (see 
recently Mari, 2008a,b; Krifka, forthcoming), and because it does not raise the 
question of what the relation between overt and covert modalities is in ISs. 
9 For an extensive discussion of this type of approach, see Cohen (2002) and Eckart 
(2000). 
More importantly, there is a general problem for „normality‟ and „ideal 
object‟ based approaches, which was pointed out by Eckart herself, whom I 
quote here (Eckart, 2000 : 241): 
“One might ask how speakers can acquire this kind of sophisticated know- 
ledge about counterfactual worlds. All they can look at is the real world 
around them. Generic beliefs should be the result of [speakers‟] desire to 
understand and characterize the world immediately surrounding them‟ 
(Pelletier & Asher 1997: 1129), yet the „normal case in the world immediately 
surrounding one‟ seems to be deeply hidden in Best World Theories.” 
This problem is not solved in the Ideal World theories because the same 
criticism applies: how can we access ‟ideal‟ objects? 
Taking the methodological question raised here seriously into account, 
one of the goals of an intensional theory of ISs is to explain how facts in the 
actual world cope with IS generalizations. These facts must be extrapolated 
from a small number of occurrences (see Cimprian, Brandone, Gelman, 
2010) and do not correspond with the vast majority of facts in the actual 
world. In the realm of genericity, exceptions seem to be more prominent than 
non-exceptional cases. 
3.3 Rule based approaches 
3.3.1 The foundations 
A third type of intensional approach is proposed in Burton-Roberts (1977). 
This type of approach denies altogether that ISs sentences are about facts of 
the actual world. They are instead statements that prescribe how the actual 
world must be. Burton-Roberts thus claims that IS-sentences express rules. 
(27) is the famous example of a gentleman opening the door for ladies. 
(27) A gentleman opens the door for ladies 
The author claims that: ”... if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, 
his mother could utter [(26)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was 
not being a gentleman...”. This view denies altogether that there might be 
exceptions to the rules. If a p entity does not satisfy q, then it is not a p entity. 
As it stands, this view seems to ensure little empirical coverage. Let us 
first consider the Italian restaurant case from (19). If one of the Italian 
restaurants breaks the law and stays open on Tuesday, one will nonetheless 
call it an „Italian‟ restaurant, and it is, in fact, still an Italian restaurant. 
The same problem arises in the case of the old turtle. A turtle that dies 
young is still a turtle. 
It seems that meaning and use are collapsed into one notion in this type 
of approach. With the assumption that ISs sentences express rules, one 
should explain what a rule is independently of the claim that ISs have a 
prescriptive use. 
3.3.2 Cohen 2001 
Cohen (2001) also develops a „rule and regulation view‟ and argues that ISs 
are thetic judgments about rules (Kuroda, 1973). 
Rules are primitives in Cohen‟s account (inspired from the Lewisian 
semantics for imperatives, Lewis, 1981) and the analysis for (27) is as in 
(28). ‟!‟ signifies that the rule is in effect. 
(28) !(gentleman(x) → opens − door − for − ladies(x)) 
Rules come in different sorts: there are biological rules, physical rules and so 
on. Advantageously, this account captures the fact that all types of IS 
statements are good candidates for IS sentences (and not only for definitional 
ones) because any type of rule can be asserted. We are sympathetic with this 
view, but Cohen‟s theory has some problems and leaves some open 
questions. 
1. The first problem in Cohen‟s theory pertains to the analysis of 
indefinites. Cohen argues that by being non-specific, the indefinite in generic 
sentences does not provide a restriction for the quantifier GEN (and thus that 
ISs are not quantificational statements). This claim is problematic. Although 
non-specific, indefinite singular generics seem to provide an entity that the 
generalization is about. The material that they provide goes into the 
restriction of GEN. Another way to put this is to say that generic sentences 
are categorical judgments (i.e., an entity is available, of which the property 
denoted by the predicate is predicated). If they were thetic judgments, 
negation of the verb would result in negation of the existence of the entity in 
the subject position, as illustrated in (29). 
(29)  a. A man entered 
 b. A man did not enter (entailment: ‟there is no man‟) 
In generic sentences this effect is not obtained, as shown in (30). 
(30)  a. A cat is intelligent 
 b. A cat is not intelligent (it is not the case that there is no cat)  
Contrary to Cohen (ibid.) and in line with Krifka et al. (1995), we will 
assume that there is universal quantification for the indefinite.  
2. Second, in addition, denying that the indefinite provides an entity that 
the generalization is about, Cohen (ibid.) argues that ISs are thetic judgments 
about rules. However, the test of negation again shows that with negation, 
one does not deny the existence of the rule, but rather expresses a prohibition.  
This is shown in (30).  
(31) A girl does not laugh too loud 
3. Third, if all types of modal bases are allowed, why is it that ISs with 
overt modality have a larger distribution than those with covert modality? 
(32) a. ??A trout is caught in different manners 
 b. A trout can be caught in different manners 
4. Fourth, why are definitional properties preferred with ISs?  
5. Finally, what is the relation between facts and rules? Cohen (ibid.) 
states that a rule is true if it is in effect. The old turtle case in (14) is 
problematic within this framework. The rule that ‟a turtle lives a long time 
span‟ is asserted and is in effect in our world. According to the theory, it is 
thus true in our world. However, it seems to be false because most turtles die 
old. 
In conclusion, although the rule based approach, which takes into 
consideration the full variety of ISs, might be on the right track, it suffers 
from not clearly spelling out the relation between facts and rules. 
4 Proposal: worlds and respects 
The discussion in the previous section leads us to identify a number of 
desiderata that a theory of ISs should satisfy. First, the variety of sentences 
must be accounted for, such that definitional statements are preferred but are 
not mandatory (see (18) and (19)). Second and related to the first 
desideratum, we must explain why ISs with overt modality have a wider 
distribution (see e.g., (16-a)). Third, one must make clear what the relation 
between facts and rules is. Fourth, one should avoid going into accessible 
worlds, on the assumption that ISs are about entities that we observe in the 
actual world. Finally, the account should provide an explanation as to why 
generalizations are accepted as felicitous, even in cases in which only a few 
individuals fall under the scope of the generalization. 
4.1 Points of view 
Mari (2008a) proposes to dissect the notion of common ground into that of 
world and respects (after Ross, 1997; Attardi and Simi, 1995; Jayez and 
Masson, 2006). The aim is to show that we are talking about turtles in our 
world (i.e., not „normal‟ or „ideal‟ objects) and also to show that the 
generalization holds under a certain respect. Here we informally introduce 
the notion of respect, and provide a formal analysis in section 4.2.  
To a first approximation, respects are amenable to contextual 
restrictions. The data that Mari (ibid.) uses to introduce the notion of respect 
come from French.  
In French it has been observed that indefinite singular sentences are 
odd, unless some restriction is provided.  
 
(33)  a. ??Un chien mange des croquettes 
 A dog eats croquettes 
b. En Autriche, un chien mange des croquettes 
In Austria, a dog eats croquettes 
 





(34) a. (It.) ??Un cane mangia crocchette 
b. (It.) In Austria, un cane mangia crocchette 
 
Respects are more general than contextual restrictions, though, and 
informally they can be compared to abstract spaces (see Charolles, 1997). 
The laws of biology, legality, and points of view related to particular 
individuals are mental, social spaces that are governed by laws. A 
classification of actual entities into categories is also an abstract space.  
Examples of abstract spaces are given in (35). Abstract spaces are generally 
introduced by prepositional phrases, which are often left dislocated.  
 
(35) a. D‟après les habitudes de ce pays, un chien mange des croquettes 
 According to the habits of this country, a dog eats croquettes 
b. D‟après moi, un chien mange des croquettes  
As far as I know, a dog eats croquettes 
 
The same type of data (left dislocated prepositional phrases) have been used 
in the literature related to modality to argue that the evaluation of the modal 
is relative to the modal basis that is introduced by the phrase (e.g. Kratzer, 
1991).  
 
(36) D‟après les lois de ce pays, tu dois aller à l‟école 
                                                          
10 In both French and Italian, there are other means to improve ISs. As extensively 
discussed in Mari (2008a), these improve when a contrastive prosody is used, or 
when an overt alternative is proposed. We do not discuss prosody and 
alternatives here, as this is the topic of Mari (2008b). 
According to the laws of this country, you must go to school 
 
Sentence (36) is generally analyzed (see Kratzer, ibid. and subsequent 
literature) as meaning that in all worlds in which the laws of this country 
hold, you go to school. The relation between spaces and modal bases will be 
clarified in the next section. 
Mari (2008a) uses two indices: a respect index i and a possible world 
index w, i.e., a pair <i,w>. Worlds are considered to belong to the 
circumstantial modal basis and correspond to a factual state of the world. For 
any i, w, w′ and expression α, if  [α]i,w ≠ [α]i,w′, then there is some factual 
difference between <i,w> and <i,w′>. Furthermore, for any i, i′, w and 
expression α, if [α]i,w ≠ [α]i′,w, then <i,w> and <i′,w> differ in the way that facts 
are interpreted. 
The notion of respect can be extended to languages in which there is no 
need to use overt prepositional phrases introducing the respect. For English, 
such a notion is argued to be at play on the basis of the empirical predictions 
it allows; this will be considered in section 5. The question of why respects 
need to be overt in some but not all languages is outside the scope of this 
paper. 
In order to get there, an analysis for respects needs to be provided, 
which is missing in Mari (2008a). Before providing such analysis, we 
consider here a criticism that has been leveled against Mari‟s proposal, in 
Mari (2008b).  
4.2 A criticism: Krifka, forthcoming 
In Mari 2008a there is no analysis of respects. In Mari 2008b, the respect 
index i is analyzed as a judge parameter. Krifka (in press) criticizes Mari 
2008b and proposes an account very much in line with the tradition going 
back to Lawler (1973), Burton-Roberts (1977), and Mari (2008b). Krifka 
claims that IS-sentences are ‟definitional‟, i.e., they provide definitions for 
words. Krifka also argues that generic sentences are sensitive to two 
parameters: worlds and interpretations of words. 
According to Krifka (forthcoming), "if a proposition is accepted 
definitionally at a common ground <I,W>, then the set of possible worlds 
stays the same, but only such interpretations i remain admissible for which 
the proposition is true in all possible worlds of the common ground." 
This view explains why ISs use a singular indefinite, as definitions 
apply to singular entities. 
Krifka (ibid.) tries to squeeze into the definitional account the whole 
variety of generic sentences, and here is where problems seem to arise. 
Krifka gives the following example in (32), saying, "... we refer to a set of 
entities defined by a natural kind and a property, in this shop. If the shop 
manager has determined that the price of a pomegranate apple is 49 cents, 
then this is a property that each pomegranate that is offered in this shop has 
by definition, based on the decision of the shop manager. This price can 
easily change the next day, but then one definition would be superseded by 
another one...." 
(37) A pomegranate in this shop costs 49 cents 
It seems that (32) is not a definition of what a pomegranate is. No matter 
what its price may be, a pomegranate is a fruit with such and such 
characteristics. The owner of the shop is not establishing a convention for the 
use of the word pomegranate, but rather a rule (i.e., how much to pay) for 
what is commonly known as a pomegranate. Assuming that what the 
manager of the shop is doing is defining the meaning of ‟pomegranate‟ will 
result in un-communicability. Two owners fixing different prices for their 
pomegranates would not be able to talk about the same type of entity. Yet 
they can, otherwise they cannot compare prices. 
(38) a. In my shop a pomegranate costs 1 dollar  
 b. In my shop a pomegranate costs 5 cents. I am going to have more 
customers! 
The same observation extends to the case of the Italian restaurant in (19). The 
meaning of the phrase ‟Italian restaurant‟ is not fixed by the fact that they are 
closed on Tuesdays. An Italian restaurant is a restaurant that serves pizza, 
pasta and is generally owned by Italian people.
11
 
While Krifka‟s view of ISs is not tenable, Mari‟s (2008b) proposal that 
respects are to be treated as judges is not tenable either (as arguably shown in 
Krifka (ibid.), as in most of the sentences discussed above in the paper there 
are no judges points of view at issue.  
We thus return to the initial intuition in Mari (2008a) that there are 







                                                          
11 This example is also problematic for accounts that claim there is a causal relation 
between the NP modifier „Italian‟ and the property denoted by the VP (e.g. 
Mari, 2008a) because there is no causal relation between being an Italian 
restaurant and being closed on Tuesdays.  
4.3 An analysis for respects 
4.3.1 Respects as subject matters 
Taking into consideration Krifka‟s criticism related to the treatment of i as a 
judge parameter, we build here on the notion of respect that we now define.  
As in Mari 2008a, we maintain the idea that an expression has varying 
truth-conditional values, according to whether it is evaluated factually or 
respect-wise.  
Our definition of respect is amenable to that of „subject matter‟ of Lewis 
(1983).  
 
We can think of a subject matter, sometimes, as a part of the world: 
the 17th Century is a subject matter, and also a part of this world. Or 
better, we can think of a subject matter as a part of the world in 
intension: a function which picks out, for any given world, the 
appropriate part- as it might be, that world's 17th Century. (If for some 
reason the world had no 17th Century, the function would be 
undefined.) We can say that two worlds are exactly alike with 
respect to a given subject matter. For instance two worlds are alike 
with respect to the 17th Century iff their 17th Centuries are exact 
intrinsic duplicates (or if neither one has a 17th Century). 
This being exactly alike is an equivalence relation. So instead of 
thinking of a subject 'matter as a part of the world in intension, we an 
think of it instead as the equivalence relation. This seems a little 
artificial. But in return it is more general, because some subject 
matters-for instance, demography-do not seem to correspond to parts 
of the world. Or if they do, it is because some contentious theory of 
"abstract" parts of the world is true. (Lewis, 1983 :161). 
 
  
We consider a respect to be a subject matter in the sense of Lewis. With 
regard to the implementation, we technically treat it as a set of propositions, 
or, alternatively, a set of sets of possible worlds. If p is a proposition that is in 
the set of relevant propositions, it defines a set of possible worlds, which is a 
subset of the modal basis. Our definition is along the lines of von Fintel and 
Gillies (2008) theory of Kernels, also inspired by Lewis‟ notion of subject 
matter.  
 
(39) Respect. A respect i is a set of propositions. If p  i, then p  W. 
 
What about the actual world? It is certainly the case that w  i. 
However, it is not guaranteed that w  i.  
When one thus considers a proposition p, it can be the case that this 
proposition is in i but it is not in w.  
Let us return to sentence (36). That you go to school is true according to 
the respect i, which is the set of propositions that constitute the laws of the 
country, but it might not be true in the actual world.  
4.3.2 Analysis 
We assume that the modal base of ISs generic sentences is circumstantial. 
Furthermore, we choose worlds in which there are turtles and restaurants that 
are just like the ones we are acquainted with. 
Let us call a pair m = <W,I> a modal viewpoint, where W is a set of 
worlds and I a set of respects. We assume that the only modal base relevant 
for ISs is the circumstantial modal base. Following the traditional assumption 
that ISs are like conditionals of the form p → q, an IS sentence is true under 
rule (34). 
(40) p → q is true in w under a modal viewpoint m iff ∃i ∈ I s.t. if p is true in w, then 
p → q is true in <w, i>. 
Unpacking p and q, the following truth conditions are obtained for an IS 
sentence.  
(41) ∀w, x∃i[p(x, w) → q(w, i, x)] 
Let us illustrate the analysis with the case of the old turtle in (14). For all x 
and for all w in the modal basis (including w), if x is a turtle in world w, then 
it has the property q in w under the respect i. A turtle is considered to die old 
only under a certain respect (the biological rules). 
5 Satisfying the desiderata 
5.1 Facts and rules 
Our discussion of Cohen‟s (2001) approach has shown that the major flaw of 
a rules and regulations approach is that it assumes that a rule is true so long 
as it is in effect. However, in these approaches, rules are disconnected from 
facts. That a turtle dies old is a rule that is in effect according to the laws of 
biology, but the facts on the ground are not always in accord with the rule. 
The rule is false in the actual world, which is taken to be a member of a 
circumstantial modal base. 
However, the interpretation of ISs does not require that facts and facts 
under respect obey the same laws. Factually, a turtle usually dies young 
(because of predators). Respect-wise (i.e., the laws of biology), a turtle dies 
old. What facts and respects are about is the same turtle in the actual world. 
The rules of biology hold for an actual turtle, and not only for a turtle that 
exists in the worlds where just the laws of biology hold, as such laws hold in 
the actual world. Still the laws hold in the actual world and, in the actual 
world, turtles die prematurely. 
5.2 Explaining exceptions 
Our view of generic statements as parametric to both worlds and respects 
explains the compatibility of generalizations with a large number of so-called 
exceptions. Looking again at the example from (14), the analysis here states 
that turtles that die young are not exceptions. Respect-wise, according to the 
laws of biology, turtles die old. As a matter of fact, the same turtles die 
young. The discrepancy between facts and respects shows that the same 
entity displays some non-uniform behavior. According to facts (and the way 
the actual world works), most turtles die because of predators; according to 
the respect (the laws of biology), turtles die old. Crucially, these laws (that of 
the actual ecosystem and that of biology) hold for the same entity, i.e., an 
individual turtle. Consequently, the turtle that dies young is not an 
„exception‟ to the generalization that turtles die old; rather, it is a turtle that 
biology-wise dies old and fact-wise dies young.  
Moreover, our account does not predict that a turtle that dies young is 
not a turtle (as is the case with Burton-Robert‟s approach). A turtle is an 
animal that obeys the laws of biology as far as its categorization as an animal 
that dies old is concerned, but it is an animal that does not factually obey the 
laws of biology because as a matter of fact, it dies young. 
5.3 Avoiding to step into non-actual worlds 
In our analysis, all the worlds quantified over by the universal quantifier 
belong to the circumstantial modal basis of w and are equally ordered. In fact, 
there is no ordering relation among them. 
 As Eckardt (2000) points out, a normal world-based account of generic 
statements faces the problem of explaining why generalizations about facts of 
our world should hold in non-actual worlds. The answer in normal based 
accounts is that non-actual worlds are ‟better‟ or ‟more normal‟ than our 
actual world. 
The analysis here is that the conditional as expressed by ISs (I am by no 
means proposing an analysis for conditionals tout court), states that if p is 
true in our world, to see what the consequences are, you do not go into a 
more normal accessible world – instead, you must adopt a respect. The 
consequences of p change according to the respect that one chooses and not 
according to the worlds one has stepped into. 
 5.4 Accounting for the variety of sentences 
5.4.1 The refrigerator, the researchers, and Italian restaurants.  
The sentences in (18) and (19) are true according to a respect. The respect 
that is selected for grounding the generalization can be relativized to a certain 
context. For example, a refrigerator costs 1000 Euros in Europe, or a 
researcher earns little money in France according to the scale of salaries of 
people with a diploma. 
This observation seems to question the status of the universal 
quantification induced by the indefinite. As in Krifka et al. (1995) we assume 
that the indefinite introduces a variable that gets bound by a universal 
quantifier. As a consequence, all entities that satisfy p must also be q entities. 
Nonetheless, the account we propose restricts the quantification to specific 
domains. This restriction is induced by the choice of the respect according to 
which the generalization holds. 
5.4.2 Why are definitional generics preferred?  
The account we are proposing predicts that generalizations can be restricted 
to specific spatio-temporal domains or to particular contexts. They can also 
be relativized to particular judges that are the sources of a categorization. 
(42) is a true generalization for preschool children, but it is a false one for 
biologists. In this case, the set of propositions that constitutes the respect is 
the set of propositions that children/biologists consider to be true.  
(42) A bird flies 
In the absence of such contextual restrictions, the generalization holds 
by default of all the p entities in the actual world. In this case, well-
established categorizations are preferred. Well-established categorizations 
have turned into definitions, and thus, in the absence of a context that allows 




5.4.3 Why are facts not a good source of ISs categorizations?  
As a corollary, it follows that facts are not a good source for respects, as in 
(43-a) and (44-a). There is no respect that establishes that the property 
                                                          
12 On the relation between concepts, definitions and categorizations, see Prasada, 
2010; Carlson, 2010. 
popular can be attributed to an entity; rather, this attribution rests on 
experience. 
 Moreover, observing that one rap song is popular does not suffice for 
determining that all rap songs are popular. 
Note, in this respect, that singularity plays a role in ISs, as opposed to 
plurality in BPs and DGs in English and Romance, respectively. This is 
illustrated by the following contrasts, noted at the beginning of the paper: 
 
(43) a. *A rap is popular  
 b. Raps are popular 
(44) a. *Un rap è popolare  
 A rap is popular 
 b. I rap sono popolari 
 ‘The’ raps are popular 
ISs generalizations are based on consideration of singular exemplars, which 
are arbitrary p instances, and this is what is expressed by universal 
quantification in the analysis that we have proposed (see Prasada 2010). As 
universal quantification is to be used, one must guarantee that the 
generalization holds of an arbitrary p instance. The popularity of a specific 
rap song cannot guarantee the popularity of any rap song. When a respect is 
chosen and a new categorization of p entities as q entities is provided, that 
categorization applies to all p entities. 
BPs and DGs in English and Romance languages are instead about a 
plurality of entities. According to Farkas and de Swart‟s proposal (Farkas and 
de Swart, 2007), BPs generalizations are true of all the entities in the plurality 
denoted by the BPs.  
Induction is an acceptable source for generalizations expressed by bare 
plurals and plural definites as the property q is verified by a plurality of p 
entities. Verification for a plurality of entities grounds statistical 
generalizations, which are supported by BPs and DGs. 
As noted above, though, ISs are compatible with non-definitional 
properties (see section 2.3). Here are some more examples. 
 
(45) a. A Norwegian student wears green socks  
b. An Italian shoe is very prestigious 
 
The question then arises of what exactly „accidental‟ means and in what 
case an „accidental‟ property can be used with indefinite singular generics. 
 
 
5.4.4 On the notion of ’accidentality’ with respect to ISs  
This discussion brings us back to the well-known question of the 
incompatibility of a generic reading of indefinites with stage-level predicates 
(e.g., Diesing 1992; Kratzer 1995; Chierchia 1995; McNally 1998; Jäger 
2001). One possible answer is that popular is simply relative to a spatio-
temporal location, and this blocks the generic reading of the indefinite, as 
explained in the cited works. 
This answer is not entirely satisfactory. As illustrated in (18), and as 
mentioned above, a fridge costs 1000 Euros in Europe. The example in (18) 
shows that the property is always relativized to a spatio-temporal location. 
The question that remains is the following: when are ‟accidental‟ 
properties accepted?  
We have claimed that in (18-c) the property q is ‟accidental‟. By 
„accident‟, I mean that there is nothing intrinsic in being, for example, a 
researcher such that it results in earning little money. ISs teach us something 
and add new information to that of the predicate ‟researcher‟. Similarly, in 
the Italian restaurant case in (19), there is nothing intrinsic in being an Italian 
restaurant that explains its being closed on Tuesdays. Thus, the generalization 
introduces a new property of Italian restaurants. 
When is this type of generalization accepted? The answer, which we 
have suggested, is only when there is a ‟respect‟ that justifies the attribution 
of property q to p entities. For (18-c), these are the scales of salaries; for the 
Italian restaurant, it is the decision of City Hall, and so on. 
The question then arises as to what ‟accidentality‟ means when ISs are 
concerned. Here, I propose to establish a difference between the nature of a 
property and the method of attribution of a property. ‟Being closed on 
Wednesday‟ is ‟accidental‟ for a restaurant because it is not ‟natural‟ for, or 
‟definitional‟ of, a restaurant (contra Krifka, forthcoming). Consequently, ISs 
are not necessarily associated with non-accidental properties. 
However, the attribution of a property is not „by accident‟. An entity is 
not characterized as q in virtue of mere circumstances, but rather in virtue of 
a decision, or a law.  
Coming back the property popular, we can now state that the reason 
why it is incompatible with ISs is not related to being relativized to a spatio-
temporal location because relativization to a spatio-temporal location of a 
property is compatible with ISs (and the generic interpretation of indefinites). 
Instead, it is the ‟method‟ of attribution of the property: the attribution of the 
property is dependent on experience, and thus it is incompatible with 
indefinite generic statements. Experience cannot guarantee that arbitrary 
instances satisfy the property because it can only guarantee a statistical 
generalization.  
In contrast, when an experience-based property is used, the indefinite 
has an existential reading because the experience on which the attribution of 
the property is based must be about a particular entity in the actual world. 
The analysis here leads us to the conclusion that ISs sentences express 
synthetic a priori judgments. The denotation of the predicate need not be 
included in the denotation of the subject, as it is in analytic statements. 
Instead, ISs classify an entity p as satisfying a property q. However, the 
attribution of the property is independent of experience (as the respect is 
independent from facts). 
5.5 Explaining the wider distribution of ISs with overt modalities 
The wider distribution of ISs with overt modalities over ISs without overt 
modalities is explained in the following way. 
As for the possibility modal can, it is important to note the basic fact 
that „it is possible that q‟ does not entail q. In a trout can be caught by many 
different methods, it does not follow that a trout is caught by many different 
methods in the actual world. As a consequence, the generalization holds of 
possible worlds and not (necessarily) of the actual world (as in normal worlds 
based accounts). It follows that almost any property can be used with overt 
modality in ISs because anything is, in principle, possible in non-actual 
worlds (assuming the relevant accessibility relation among worlds of the 
modal base, in this case, the circumstantial modal base). 
As for the modal must, one could argue that (46) holds and that the 
reasoning that applies to the possibility modal does not apply to the necessity 
modal. 
(46) NEC q → q 
This observation is not entirely correct. When must is used in ISs, it has 
a deontic interpretation. Deontic must does not obey the axiom in (46). For 
example, (47) is felicitous in a context in which the addressee does not go to 
school (see Mari and Schweitzer, 2011; pace Ninan, 2005). 
(47) You must go to school! 
As a consequence, as q is not necessarily true in the actual world, it 
follows that any property can be a q property in ISs with an overt deontic 
modal must (again, assuming that the same laws hold in the actual and the 





This paper has provided a new analysis for ISs that has taken into 
consideration facts and their categorization. We have argued that ISs express 
statements about entities in the actual world that hold under a certain respect. 
We have provided a model of respects, elaborating on a classical Kratzerian 
framework, which has shed new light on a number of questions that had 
previously remained unanswered within the ‟rules and regulation‟ type of 
approaches that I have adopted here. 
The main result showed that ISs are not analytic or definitional 
statements, but rather express synthetic a priori judgments. We have thus 
covered a number of unexplained cases.  
This view allows us to provide a pragmatic explanation for the 
incompatibility of generic indefinites with stage-level properties; this 
explanation does not use spatio-temporal restrictions on predicates, nor event 
arguments. It rather explains that experience based predicates must have an 
object of experience and thus existence of the object is implied. 
Having shown that GEN is not the covert counterpart of overt modality 
in ISs, we considered the case of overt modalities in ISs and explained why 
they have a wider distribution than ISs without overt modality. 
Finally, by appealing to a plural feature along the lines of Farkas and de 
Swart (2007), we have proposed a new explanation for why bare plurals and 
definite plural generics, in English and Romance, respectively, are 
compatible with experience-based properties.  
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